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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
When he was

Jacob Corban Coleman pleaded guilty, under a

binding plea agreement, to first degree murder. The district court imposed a unified sentence of
life imprisonment, with forty years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Coleman asserts the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed the fixed term of his sentence.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Coleman was born with an oversized tongue and enlarged tonsils and adenoids, and
he snored and frequently choked as an infant. (See Con£ Exs., p.24.) 1 Before he finished grade
school, Mr. Coleman underwent three ear tube insertions, as well as surgery to remove his tonsils
and adenoids. (See Con£ Exs., p.24.) However, his snoring persisted, and he also developed
night terrors and has never slept well. (See Con£ Exs., p.24.)
Both of Mr. Coleman's parents grew up in homes where domestic violence took place,
and during Mr. Coleman's childhood, his father was physically abusive to his mother. (See
Con£ Exs., pp.25-27, 31.) By the time he reached fourth grade, Mr. Coleman and his family had
moved eight times. (Conf. Exs., p.25.)

During Mr. Coleman's early childhood, his father was

abusing alcohol and methamphetamine. (See Con£ Exs., pp.25-26.) Mr. Coleman had reported
speech articulation defects and motor delays in the first grade, and his developmental problems
became worse in the second grade. (See Conf. Exs., pp.26-28.) After Mr. Coleman's father was
arrested and extradited to Alabama on an old warrant, Mr. Coleman and the rest of his family
were evicted from their apartment.

(See Con£ Exs., p.29.)

Mr. Coleman's mother told

Mr. Coleman and his siblings that their father had gone on vacation. (See Con£ Exs., p.29.)
Mr. Coleman had gone through an individualized educational plan from the first to the
fifth grades, but after those services were terminated, he shortly thereafter began to have serious
attendance problems at school. (See Con£ Exs., pp.28-30.) When he entered junior high, he
started acting out within two months.

(See Con£ Exs., p.30.) He began cheating, and also

accrued a large number of excused absences. (See Conf. Exs., p.31.) In the summer between

1

All citations to "Conf. Exs." refer to the 391-page PDF version of the Confidential Exhibits,
including the Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum and its Appendix.
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ninth and tenth grade, Mr. Coleman jumped off a roof “for fun.” (Conf. Exs., p.31.) His
behavior in social contexts was characterized as odd. (See Conf. Exs., p.32.)
In high school, Mr. Coleman tried to fit in more, joining the football team as a
sophomore. (See Conf. Exs., pp.32-33.) But while the team accepted him, Mr. Coleman was too
slight to be effective and was seldom chosen to run plays. (See Conf. Exs., p.33.) Mr. Coleman
also enrolled in debate class, but failed the class both semesters. (Conf. Exs., p.33.) His
sophomore GPA was 1.7. (Conf. Exs., p.34.) Around this time, Mr. Coleman witnessed a girl
get hit by a truck at an intersection. (See Conf. Exs., p.33.)
By the time of Mr. Coleman’s junior year, his father had relapsed, was using
methamphetamine and heroin, and was also unemployed. (See Conf. Exs., p.34.) The family
was on public assistance, and Mr. Coleman’s mother was struggling with whether to stay
married. (See Conf. Exs., p.34.) Mr. Coleman’s mother had to work all the time to make ends
meet, and Mr. Coleman was unprepared for the additional responsibilities that came with her
depending on him to fill his father’s shoes. (See Conf. Exs., pp.34-35.) During this period,
Mr. Coleman made statements about bombs, and his school treated his words as a bomb threat
and expelled him.

(See Conf. Exs., p.35.)

The police did not find any evidence that

Mr. Coleman had researched, planned, or worked on a bomb, and the expulsion was later
changed to a suspension. (Conf. Exs., p.35.)
Later in his junior year, Mr. Coleman wrote a suicide note, and he was again suspended
when the student who received the note reported it. (See Conf. Exs., p.36.) Mr. Coleman then
asked to meet with a counselor, but he only met with a counseling intern for three months. (See
Conf. Exs., p.36.) Midway through that period of counseling, Mr. Coleman reportedly jumped
off a moving bus and injured his arms, because he wanted to see what it felt like. (See Conf.
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Exs., pp.36-37.) The counseling intern referred Mr. Coleman for a psychological evaluation, but
after the evaluation, Mr. Coleman’s mother never followed through with the recommendations
for therapy. (See Conf. Exs., p.37.) The school administration directed Mr. Coleman to finish
high school online. (Conf. Exs., p.37.) Mr. Coleman was able to graduate and walk with his
class, but his final cumulative GPA at Puyallup High School in Puyallup, Washington, was 1.5.
(Conf. Exs., pp.37, 115-16.)
Following his graduation, Mr. Coleman enrolled in courses at the local community
college, but did not complete a single credit. (See Conf. Exs., p.38.) He also took steps to enroll
in an online paralegal college, but did not follow through with that either. (See Conf. Exs., p.38.)
Meanwhile, he composed another suicide note and stored it in his email drafts. (See Conf. Exs.,
p.38.) Mr. Coleman’s father was still an active drug addict, and the family conducted an
unsuccessful intervention around Christmas. (See Conf. Exs., p.38.) Mr. Coleman was a virtual
recluse, staying inside with one of his brothers all day. (See Conf. Exs., p.38.) By the next
spring, Mr. Coleman’s father was in a methadone program, and Mr. Coleman spoke with his
parents about college. (See Conf. Exs., p.39.) Mr. Coleman started working part-time at two
jobs, and when a mutual friend from work texted him about his father stealing from her and
asking for methamphetamine, Mr. Coleman realized his father had relapsed. (See Conf. Exs.,
p.39.) Later, in the summer, Mr. Coleman had a panic attack while riding the bus to work with
his father. (See Conf. Exs., p.39.)
Mr. Coleman’s parents thought of Mr. Coleman as a genius, even though his IQ is “above
average” and his cumulative high school GPA was 1.5. (See Conf. Exs., p.41.) Mr. Coleman’s
family also claimed that he was the captain of his high school football team, when he was not.
(See Conf. Exs., p.33.) Additionally, his family believed he was captain of the debate team,
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when no such position existed. (See Conf. Exs., p.33.) After the “bomb threat,” Mr. Coleman’s
mother believed that Mr. Coleman was especially upset over being removed as president of the
honor society, even though Mr. Coleman had never been admitted to the honor society and was
actually ineligible to join. (See Conf. Exs., p.35-36.)
Mr. Coleman bought a one-way plane ticket to Spokane. (See Conf. Exs., p.40.) The day
before the scheduled flight, Mr. Coleman told his uncle he had been accepted at Gonzaga
University. (See Conf. Exs., p.43.) He had also told that to his sister, and asked her to take him
to the airport. (See Conf. Exs., p.43.) His sister threw a going-away party for him. (See Conf.
Exs., pp.43-44.) When Mr. Coleman’s mother learned at the last minute, she asked him if he had
applied for admission and completed his application for financial assistance. (See Conf. Exs.,
p.43.) Mr. Coleman reported he had done so and also had scholarships, but none of that was
true. (See Conf. Exs., p.43.) Mr. Coleman then flew from Seattle to Spokane, and took public
transportation to Gonzaga. (See Conf. Exs., pp.43-44.) That morning, Mr. Coleman submitted a
financial aid application. (See Conf. Exs., p.44.) He went to the housing office at Gonzaga, gave
them a false name, and represented himself as if he were enrolled, but the university did not have
any housing for him. (See Conf. Exs., p.44.)
Mr. Coleman went back to the airport, contacted a short-term labor recruiter and two
military recruiters, and eventually decided to travel to Hope, Idaho. (See Conf. Exs., p.45.) At
this point, Mr. Coleman was despondent and contemplating suicide. (See Conf. Exs., p.45.)
That afternoon, Mr. Coleman hired a taxi driver, Gagandeep Singh. (See Conf. Exs., p.46.) He
gave Mr. Singh a fake address for an imaginary friend who lived in Hope. (Conf. Exs., p.46.)
Over two hours later, Mr. Coleman had Mr. Singh stop at a Walmart in Sandpoint. (See
Conf. Exs., p.46.) In the Walmart, Mr. Coleman bought a knife. (Conf. Exs., p.46.) They later
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inadvertently drove past Hope, and Mr. Singh stopped at the Clark Fork boat check station to ask
an officer for directions. (See Conf. Exs., p.46.) The officer advised them to double back to
Hope and have Mr. Coleman’s friend collect him at a gas station.

(Conf. Exs., p.46.)

Mr. Coleman’s statements made after his arrest indicated that, at this time, he was seriously
thinking about suicide, or losing himself in the deep woods of Idaho. (See Conf. Exs., p.46.)
Mr. Singh and Mr. Coleman subsequently pulled into a gas station in Hope, and
Mr. Coleman stayed inside the taxi minivan for about five minutes. (See Conf. Exs., p.46.)
Mr. Singh was tired of driving Mr. Coleman around North Idaho, and intended to drive him back
to the airport. (See Conf. Exs., p.46.) About fifteen minutes later, Mr. Singh parked next to a
gas station in Kootenai, because Mr. Coleman had confessed to him that he wanted to commit
suicide and Mr. Singh wanted to warn Mr. Coleman’s family. (See Conf. Exs., p.46.) Mr. Singh
asked for Mr. Coleman’s phone, and Mr. Coleman opened it and gave a false number for his
mother. (See Conf. Exs., pp.46-47.) When Mr. Coleman realized that Mr. Singh was searching
the phone for the correct number, he snapped and stabbed Mr. Singh multiple times, inflicting
mortal wounds. (See Conf. Exs., pp.46-47.)
Over an hour later, Mr. Singh’s brother, co-owner of their taxi company, called the
authorities to request a welfare check on Mr. Singh. (See R., p.345.) Mr. Singh’s brother soon
afterwards reported that he had just received a text from Mr. Singh, asking him to call the cops.
(See R., p.345.) A Bonner County Sheriff’s Deputy responded to the location of Mr. Singh’s
taxi.

(See R., p.345.)

The deputy found Mr. Singh’s body on the floor of the taxi, and

Mr. Coleman inside the taxi holding a cell phone and a knife. (See R., p.346.) The deputy
ordered Mr. Coleman out of the taxi and handcuffed him.
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(See R., p.346.)

After being

Mirandized, Mr. Coleman told the deputy he would tell him everything, if the deputy promised
to keep his family name out of it. (See R., p.346.)
The State charged Mr. Coleman by Information with murder in the first degree,
I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003, and 18-4004, with a use of a deadly weapon sentencing
enhancement under I.C. § 19-2520. (R., pp.78-79.) Mr. Coleman entered a not guilty plea.
(R., p.80.) The State later filed a Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty. (R., pp.108-09.)
Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Mr. Coleman later agreed to plead guilty to first
degree murder. (R., pp.334-36.) The State agreed to, provisionally, file a motion to withdraw
the death notice. (R., p.335.) The parties “agreed that the Court, after providing both parties
adequate opportunity to present mitigating and aggravating evidence at a sentencing hearing to
be held at a later date, shall impose a determinate prison sentence of not less than 20 nor more
than 40 years.” (R., p.336.) The parties recognized that the district court was required “to
impose an indeterminate sentence of life imprisonment.” (R., p.336.) The district court accepted
Mr. Coleman’s guilty plea. (Tr. 11/09/18, p.15, Ls.17-25.) The State withdrew its death notice.
(See Tr. 11/09/18, p.15, Ls.20-22.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Coleman recommended the district court impose a unified
sentence of life imprisonment, with twenty years fixed. (Tr. 01/03/19, p.97, L.8 – p.98, L.11.)
Defense counsel asked for twenty years because, even though Mr. Coleman would spend half his
life behind bars before possibly becoming parole-eligible, it would still give him a light at the
end of the tunnel. (See Tr. 01/03/19, p.97, Ls.5-14.) In his comments to the district court,
Mr. Coleman stated, “I think 30 years is the most appropriate time given that—because I can—
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40 years won't do me anything." 2 (Tr. 01/03/19, p.100, Ls.14-16.) The State recommended the
district court impose a unified sentence of life imprisonment, with forty years fixed.

(Tr.

01/03/19, p.79, Ls.14-21.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of life imprisonment,
with forty years fixed. (R., pp.371-73.) Upon the State's motion, the district court dismissed the
use ofa deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. (See R., pp.376-77.)
Mr. Coleman filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction. (R., pp.378-80; see R., pp.385-89 (Amended Notice of Appeal).)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a fixed term of forty years, as part of a
unified sentence of life imprisonment, upon Mr. Coleman following his plea of guilty to first
degree murder?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Fixed Term Of Forty Years, As
Part Of A Unified Sentence Of Life Imprisonment, Upon Mr. Coleman Following His Plea Of
Guilty To First Degree Murder
Mr. Coleman asserts the district court abused its discretion in when it imposed a fixed
term of forty years, as part of a unified sentence of life imprisonment, upon him following his
plea of guilty to first degree murder.

The district court should have instead followed the

recommendation of Mr. Coleman's counsel by imposing a unified sentence of life imprisonment,
with twenty years fixed. (See Tr. 01/03/19, p.97, L.8 - p.98, L.11.) Alternatively, the district
court should have followed Mr. Coleman's own comments by imposing a fixed term of thirty
years. (See Tr. 01/03/19, p.100, Ls.14-15.)

2

At the conclusion of his comments, Mr. Coleman asked: "I can't really-I will never be able to
make up for what I did. But does that mean that I have to give up on everything?" (Tr.
01/03/19, p.101, Ls.1-3.) He stated, "Then 40 years, let's do this." (Tr. 01/03/19, p.101, L.4.)
8

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving “due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Coleman does not assert that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Coleman must show that in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria
or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the

individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or
retribution for wrongdoing.

Id.

An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a

sentence . . . consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726
(2007). The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the
defendant’s probable term of confinement.” Id.
Mr. Coleman asserts the fixed term of his sentence imposed by the district court is
excessive considering any view of the facts, because the district court did not adequately
consider mitigating factors.

Specifically, the district court did not adequately consider

Mr. Coleman’s difficult childhood. As suggested in the Statement of the Facts & Course of
Proceedings above, Mr. Coleman’s upbringing was impacted by family instability, social
isolation, and other serious problems. Mr. Coleman’s grandmother on his mother’s side was the
victim of physical abuse by her husband, Mr. Coleman’s grandfather. (See Conf. Exs., p.21.)
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Mr. Coleman’s grandparents on his father’s side also participated in domestic violence. (Conf.
Exs., pp.21-22.) Mr. Coleman’s father beat Mr. Coleman’s mother when she was pregnant with
Mr. Coleman. (See Conf. Exs., p.23.) When Mr. Coleman was about five years old, his father
incurred a domestic violence charge for choking Mr. Coleman’s mother. (See Conf. Exs., p.26.)
Around the time Mr. Coleman was in first grade, other members of the family found
Mr. Coleman’s mother sitting in the bathtub with a bloody nose, and Mr. Coleman’s father stated
she had hit herself. (See Conf. Exs., p.27.) When Mr. Coleman was in junior high, his father
allegedly broke his mother’s finger, but the incident was not reported. (See Conf. Exs., p.31.)
Beyond the periodic domestic violence, Mr. Coleman’s family was unstable in other
ways. His family moved eight times by the time he reached fourth grade. (Conf. Exs., p.25.) At
times, a total of twelve people from Mr. Coleman’s extended family were living in
Mr. Coleman’s residences, such as an 1,800 square foot mobile home with one bathroom. (See
Conf. Exs., pp.26-27.) Mr. Coleman’s father was abusing methamphetamine and alcohol in
Mr. Coleman’s early childhood, and later moved to methamphetamine and heroin when
Mr. Coleman was in high school. (See Conf. Exs., pp.26, 34.) When Mr. Coleman’s father was
in jail in Alabama, his mother took up a job at a daycare, but the family was evicted from their
apartment. (See Conf. Exs., p.29.) The Coleman children reported that for the next month, they
lived in tents, a car, motels, and their uncle’s business. (See Conf. Exs., p.29.) During and after
Mr. Coleman’s time in high school, his father relapsed into drug addiction several times, and
Mr. Coleman was hard-pressed to take on additional responsibilities to support their household.
(See Conf. Exs., pp.34-35, 37.)
Mr. Coleman underwent procedures at an early age to insert ear tubes and to remove his
tonsils and adenoids, but his problems with snoring and sleep in general persisted. (See Conf.
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Exs., p.24.) In preschool, his teachers noticed that Mr. Coleman seemed to be chronically tired,
and he had speech problems and motor delays. (See Conf. Exs., p.26.) His records from first
grade noted that he had hand tremors, speech difficulties, excessive drooling, and an inability to
walk down the hall without balancing himself by touching a wall. (See Conf. Exs., pp.27-28.)
While the school put him on an individualized educational plan, by the second grade his motor
and speech needs had become more pronounced, and there was an increase in tremors, drooling,
and slurring. (See Conf. Exs., p.28.) Later in the second grade, his teachers noted that he was
having difficulty communicating his thinking processes, he was nervous and fearful, and he cried
in the classroom. (See Conf. Exs., p.28.) Additionally, Mr. Coleman avoided other children,
played by himself, and was chosen last. (Conf. Exs., p.28.)
Mr. Coleman had documented behavior problems in the fifth grade, after changing
schools for the eighth time. (See Conf. Exs., p.30.) At the end of the fifth grade, the school
district terminated his individualized educational program services.

(Conf. Exs., p.30.)

Mr. Coleman accumulated sixteen excused absences in the sixth grade. (Conf. Exs., p.30.) He
had over a dozen excused absences each year in the seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. (See
Conf. Exs., p.31.) He had three reported incidents of cheating and being insubordinate in one
school year. (See Conf. Exs., p.32.) At the time the sentencing memorandum was prepared,
Mr. Coleman attributed his depression and acting out in school as a delayed reaction to the death
of his beloved grandmother. (See Conf. Exs., pp.31-32.)
Mr. Coleman’s social isolation was often coupled with behavior others would describe as
odd. For example, Mr. Coleman joined a Christian after-school group in junior high, “but,
although he attended some of the events and gathering, he sat against the wall or wandered
around on the outskirts of the room.” (See Conf. Exs., p.32.) Mr. Coleman “had a detached
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aura, gazing off for significant periods of time and then returning his focus to stare at persons or
objects as if nothing was there.” (Conf. Exs., p.32.) The leader of the group described an
incident where Mr. Coleman left a field trip without telling anyone, and when an adult found
him, Mr. Coleman aimed a pepper spray container at the adult, but without spraying it. (See
Conf. Exs., p.32.) Mr. Coleman went with a girl to his ninth grade dance, but the girl reported
she felt uncomfortable in his presence. (See Conf. Exs., p.32.) That was apparently the only
time Mr. Coleman ever dated. (See Conf. Exs., p.32.)
Later, in the summer between ninth and tenth grade, Mr. Coleman jumped off a roof “for
fun.” (See Conf. Exs., p.32.) “After the incident he went to the neighbor’s and showed him what
he had done.” (Conf. Exs., p.32.) Similarly, while undergoing counseling in high school,
Mr. Coleman reportedly “jumped off a moving bus to see what it felt like, sustaining a forearm
fracture.”

(See Conf. Exs., p.36.)

“When asked, he told the neighbor and eventually his

counselor that he ‘wanted to see what it felt like—I feel no pain.’” (Conf. Exs., p.37.)
Perhaps no incident better illustrates the intersection between Mr. Coleman’s social
isolation and “odd” behavior than the “bomb threat” from his junior year. “There are conflicting
reports about what Jacob actually said and did but the school treated his words as a security
threat.” (Conf. Exs., p.35.) While Mr. Coleman “certainly made mention of bombs and how
destructive they can be . . . the police did not locate any evidence indicating that he had
researched, planned or worked on a bomb.” (Conf. Exs., p.35.) Although the school later
converted his expulsion to a suspension, “the damage to what remained of his academic progress
and socialization was simply beyond repair.” (See Conf. Exs., p.35.) Moreover, Mr. Coleman
“minimized the incident by saying he was kidding and re-framing the story to make himself the
hero who was taking the fall for some other students.” (Conf. Exs., p.35.) He claimed that he
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and some other students were merely talking about bombs, and he stepped up to take the
punishment when another student took them out of context. (Conf. Exs., p.35.) Mr. Coleman’s
position was not supported by the incident reports, but his father stated Mr. Coleman was a
“hero” for taking the hit for others without flinching. (See Conf. Exs., p.35.)
As documented above, Mr. Coleman’s family also took other unsupported views of
Mr. Coleman’s accomplishments.

The Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum stated that

Mr. Coleman’s parents “exhibit a strong tendency to see themselves as good parents . . . and to
facilitate this desire the[y] are constantly creating an alternative reality in which their children’s
problems and misdeeds are trivialized or recast as ‘misunderstandings’ while their smallest
achievements are gilded well beyond anything approaching reality.” (Conf. Exs., p.41.) Thus,
Mr. Coleman’s family thought he was a genius despite his above-average IQ, and believed he
had leadership positions on the football team and other school groups that he did not have. (See
Conf. Exs., pp.33-34, 41-42.) Mr. Coleman and his family even mischaracterized his single date
at the ninth grade dance as an ongoing romantic relationship.

(See Conf. Exs., p.32.)

Mr. Coleman “was a participant in this destructive myth making. . . . All his life Jacob has been
forced and yet content to be the person in the myths rather than the person he really is.” (Conf.
Exs., p.48.) As the sentencing memorandum put it, “Rather than confronting Jacob’s obvious
developmental issues and helping him deal with them, his parents concocted a narrative in which
he was a genius, a hero and so far advanced intellectually that his problems were nothing more
than the failure of others to recognize and accommodate his brilliance.” (Conf. Exs., p.42.)
The other institutions in Mr. Coleman’s childhood also largely failed to help him. For
example, his individualized educational plan services were terminated after the fifth grade, with
no apparent reasons found in the record.

(See Conf. Exs., p.30.)
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In junior high, school

administrators did not pursue remedial measures to deal with Mr. Coleman's acting out. (See
Conf. Exs., pp.30-31.) Mr. Coleman's high school let him continue to sign up for Advanced
Placement classes, despite his low GP A. (See Conf. Exs., p.34.) In the words of the Defendant's
Sentencing Memorandum, "Apparently, rather than taking appropriate actions to provide Jacob
with the services he clearly required, the school administration was content to simply let him get
by." (Conf. Exs., p.34.)
While the school district finally initiated an academic intervention after Mr. Coleman's
"bomb threat," the school did not address the other risk factors in Mr. Coleman's life. (See Conf.
Exs., p.35.) The school failed to recognize Mr. Coleman's inner struggles, failed to see the signs
of his toxic home environment, and failed to require him to meet with a guidance counselor or
refer him for social services. (See Conf. Exs., p.35.) Nor did the police follow through at this
juncture. (See Con£ Exs., p.35.) Likewise, after Mr. Coleman's suspension prompted by his
suicide note, no professionals intervened. (See Conf. Exs., p.36.)
Alongside Mr. Coleman's experiences during his difficult childhood, the district court
also did not adequately consider Mr. Coleman's mental health issues. Phillip A. Hanger, Ph.D.,
in his psychological evaluation of Mr. Coleman, diagnosed him with persistent depressive
disorder (dysthymia) and schizoid personality disorder.

(Def. Ex. B, 01/17/18, p.9.)3

Per

Dr. Hanger, the impression offered from the results of Mr. Coleman's earlier competency
evaluation "characterized Mr. Coleman as distant and aloof, particularly in response to his
current life stressors, with a pattern of traits suggestive of a maladaptive personality style
characterized by social indifference and flattened affective responsiveness .... " (See Def. Ex.
B., p.4.) In that competency evaluation, Dr. Hanger wrote that "Mr. Coleman suffers from a

3

Defendant's Exhibit B, Dr. Hanger's psychological evaluation report, is a sealed exhibit that
appears as part of the 31-page PDF version of the additional confidential exhibits.
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pervasive, maladaptive personality style, but does not exhibit a significant pattern or history
suggestive of a serious mental illness," and found he was competent to continue with the legal
process. (See Def Ex. A, 09/18/17, p.10 ( emphasis in original). )4
In the psychological evaluation, Dr. Hanger stated that Mr. Coleman was considered at an
elevated risk for self-harm, and his "maladaptive personality style limits his ability to adapt and
cope with life stressors, which confound his pervasive, mild depression." (Def Ex. B., p.8
(emphasis in original).) Mr. Coleman's "pattern of depressed mood has apparently persisted for
several years, but has not reached the severity of a major depressive disorder-in part, due to
Mr. Coleman's pattern of masking his emotional expression." (Def Ex. B., p.8.)
Dr. Hanger also wrote: "Mr. Coleman's personality style may be characterized by a
detachment from social relationships, consistent with a Schizoid Personality Disorder.

He

displays a restricted range of emotional expression, particularly during interpersonal contact."
(Def. Ex. B, p.8 (emphasis in original).) However, "This pattern of maladaptive personality does
not reflect a disorder in cognitive processing or reality testing, such as may be seen with a
psychotic disorder." (Def Ex. B, p.8 (emphasis in original).)
At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Hanger testified that Mr. Coleman's personality disorder
was pervasive "in the sense that this is a condition that will be seen persistently throughout his
life, like starting in early adolescence from my review of his history and across various settings."
(Tr. 01/03/19, p.49, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Coleman's personality disorder was maladaptive "in the
sense that it impairs, it limits his effectiveness, the functioning effectiveness, and primarily social
function." (Tr. 01/03/19, p.49, L.24- p.50, L.1.) Dr. Hanger explained the personality aspect of
the disorder meant it was "a pattern underlying his decision-making. It's a pattern of his life

4

Defendant's Exhibit A, Dr. Hanger's competency evaluation report, is also a sealed exhibit in
the 31-page PDF.
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choices, not just a mood. But it can influence a person’s mood, not just their behavior, but it can
direct their behavior.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.50, Ls.2-6.)
Additionally, Dr. Hanger testified that Mr. Coleman’s behavior in not completing the
application to Gonzaga University, having only initiated the financial aid application, was
consistent with his maladaptive personality disorder “in the sense that that’s a further pattern of
his ineffectiveness, his inability to benefit from feedback from others to recognize either the need
for assistance or when it might be helpful either from the university, from counselors, from
family members.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.56, Ls.2-19.) Dr. Hanger saw a pattern “pervading his life
that he is ineffective in doing these kinds of socially-engaging tasks; applying for a job, applying
for a school.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.56, Ls.20-23.)
Dr. Hanger also testified that he had found Mr. Coleman to be asocial, not antisocial.
(See Tr. 01/03/19, p.62, L.22 – p.63, L.8.) He did not find the existence of psychopathy in his
examinations of Mr. Coleman. (See Tr. 01/03/19, p.64, L.25 – p.65, L.4.) Dr. Hanger explained
that Mr. Coleman’s persistent depressive disorder and schizoid personality disorder were
treatable. (Tr. 01/03/19, p.65, Ls.5-11.) The depressive disorder was treatable “with both
traditional therapy as well as potentially medication management to assist the individual in
overcoming the symptoms.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.66, Ls.3-6.) The schizoid personality disorder
would be more challenging to treat, requiring “a great deal more of effortful treatment,
counseling, group counseling specifically for schizoid personality to assess—or assist the
individual in acclimating, identifying those social norms, getting that feedback.” (Tr. 01/03/19,
p.66, Ls.11-18.) Dr. Hanger concluded that Mr. Coleman’s acquiring “that ability to use society
to help him problem solve will benefit him greatly.” (See Tr. 01/03/19, p.67, Ls.5-7.)
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Further, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Coleman’s youth, especially in
view of the lengthy fixed sentence he was facing in any event under the binding plea agreement.
Mr. Coleman was only

when he committed the instant offense, and

when he pleaded guilty. (See R., pp.78, 334-36.) During the sentencing hearing,
Mr. Coleman’s counsel asserted that the fixed sentence of twenty years he requested “would
mean that if imposed, and if Jacob qualified for parole—and that is by no means a given in this
case—when he walked out of that penitentiary with the supervision by the parole commission, he
would have spent fully half of his life behind bars.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.97, Ls.8-14.) Conversely,
the forty-year fixed sentence recommended by the State would mean that, at a minimum,
Mr. Coleman “will have spent two-thirds of his entire life . . . behind prison walls” before his
parole. (See Tr. 01/03/19, p.97, Ls.15-19.)
As defense counsel asserted at the sentencing hearing, “But what I think is most
important here for Jacob is that there be a glimmer of hope that he can in fact rewire himself, that
he can become the person that his parents hoped he would be, that he can become eventually the
person that he wanted to be, that he can return to society with something to contribute.”
(Tr. 01/03/19, p.96, Ls.13-22.) Mr. Coleman’s counsel asserted that the problem with long
prison sentences “is that a prison sentence can be too long. That by the time a person leaves the
penitentiary he or she is so completely changed, so completely without hope, so completely
without any social tool kit whatever that they will be a walking zombie.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.96,
L.23 – p.97, L.4.) Defense counsel asked the district court that, “in effect you leave a candle
burning, however faintly, in the window; that you give Jacob the opportunity to in some small
way atone for what he has done. That you do not slam the prison gates so hard and for so long a
period of time that he just gives up all hope.” (Tr. 01/03/19, p.97, Ls.20-25.)
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Because the district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors, the
fixed term of the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering any view of the
facts.

Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the fixed term of

Mr. Coleman's sentence.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Coleman respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed
term of his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 28 th day of October, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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